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The information you have 
is not what you want 
The information you want 
is not what you need 
The informatioon you need 
is not available.
- Finagle*s Law of Information
Sweet and cloying through the dark air 
Falls the stifling scent of despair;
The forms take shape in the dark air;
Puss-purr of leopard, footfall of plodding bear
Palm-pat of nodding ape, square hyena waiting
For laughter, laughter, laughter. The Lords of hell are here.
- Murder In The Cathedral
Introductory Note
These are background notes on economic structure, policy and change in 
Occupied Namibia over 1977-1985. They do not purport to be a presentation of 
perverse adjustment but a set of data relevant to such a presentation.
Occupied Namibia 1977-85 is not quite as whimsical a case to look at in terms
of adjustment as it may seem:
a. it suffers from the SSA four horsemen of external trade shocks, debt,
drought and weakening of the polity;
b. it sought to operate what amounted to a neo-Xeynesian policy of demand
maintenance and private sector encouragement;
c. it had ridden out previous shocks moderately successfully in
macro-economic terms;
d. government intervention has been detailed at the same time that quite
real dependence on the private sector has been acknowledged, welcomed and 
- in some senses - efforts to support it acted upon;
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e. sub-class interests are markedly (if confusedly) divergent in ways
rendering simple capital/labour or foreign/domestic dichotomies crudely
reductionist;
f. devaluation and interest rates have not been used effectively (albeit for 
special reasons);
g. particular actions have related to political attempts to shore up a
viable sub-class coalition for the regime within perceived budgetary, 
investor and external constraints;
h. the results have been quite disastrous on almost any set of criteria.
These are the stigmata of non-adjustment or failed adjustment in SSA generally
not just in Occupied Namibia. For some purposes it may he helpful to look at
them in the context of a regime for which one is unlikely to wish to find
excuses.
It should be stressed that while the Liberation War has weakened the economy 
it has not been the principal cause of the decline. Nor has it self evidently 
forced the policy of non-adjustment. Rhodesia had comparable war costs 
(indeed higher as it financed them itself and had a 3 to 5$ of GDP sanctions 
evasion cost burden) but adopted and held to a neo-orthodox adjustment 
strategy which in terms of stabilisation in the sense of balance did work, in 
the sense of steadying output did no worse than that of Occupied Namibia and 
in respect to evolution of production capacity and structure at least arguably
laid a foundation for recovery not mortgaged by a huge external debt nor
budgetary gap overhang.
Two evident differences in approach between the Rhodesian and SWA/Namibia
regimes are:
a. basic reliance on own resources and rapid adjustment of external and
budgetary balance versus heavy use of external resources and no
discernable concern about external (or until recently budgetary) balance;
b. concern with acting at current use and at structural level to reduce the
underlying import/GDP ratio and to expand exportable production versus a
total concern (even if hardly a targeted one) with the latter.
The "New Conventional Wisdom” would sugest that ”a” was a cause of Rhodesia’s 
less unsatisfactory (especially in its own terms - but ironically probably in
t I
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terms of the successor state’s inheritance as well) performance but would not 
make any such suggestion in respect to ”b”.
It is perfectly true that in part the difference in respect to "a” was
enforced on Rhodesia but it had more financing room than it used just as it is 
also true that Rhodesia had more leeway to look inward as well as outward than 
does the SWA/Namibia regime, but that the latter has not tried to widen the 
limits or even to go up to them in any coherent fashion.
While the statistsics run out in 1983, 1983-85 does not include any major
break in trend - either as to policy or results. As in most long running
non-adjustment non-strategies, budgetary deficits and external borrowing (here
in a sense englobing what would more usually be perceived as external balance) 
have given increasing concern to several sub-classes as well as to the
bureaucracy while at the same time concern (often by the same groups) about 
unemployment and erosion of real incomes has also become more acute. The 
policy results are similar too - a budgetary/borrowing/wage restraint package 
which is indeed "a thing of shreds and patches” married to a ’wandering 
minstrel” calling for entrepreneurial initiative, a smaller state and a 
melange of particular subsidies to poultice particular wounds. It is perhaps 
needless to add that the deficit reduction (in real terms) is trivial, the 
output decline unabated and the satisfaction of any sub-class minimal with no
particular prospects of any change for the better unless and until some holy
grail should turn up, e.g. an end to drought, a return of the fish schools, a 
hydrocarbon field, a recovery of the world minerals market, a major new 
mineral development and/or two years of pure peace and tranquility (a package 
of mildly inadequate and/or unlikely dei ex machinae no more unique to 
Occupied Namibia than are the febrile enthusiasms they engender).
The author must underline that he does not by the above - or the below - imply
any acceptance of the legitimacy of the SWA/Namibia Occupation Regime; a point 
his other writing on Namibia should make abundantly clear. That illegitimacy, 
however, does not necessarily imply that its non-adjustment policy is unique 
nor that examination of the reasons for (and results of) it are uninteresting 
either in relation to Namibia or more generally.
It is tempting to contrast adjustment in Botswana with non-adjustment in 
Occupied Namibia. Both are small economies with dominant (as to value of
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output) mineral sectors and important agricultural sectors. Both have had 
high historic patterns of GDP, public expenditure and (at least in terms of 
volume and cost) services growth. Both have been severely drought afflicted. 
Botswana adjusted rapidly, coherently and orthodoxly (in the short term via 
interest rates and the medium, via real wage cuts) and Occupied Namibia did 
not.
However, this surface set of simple contrasts is less convincing on closer 
examination:
a. Botswana’s mineral sector (for very special reasons) surged after a one 
year slump; no such recovery has characterised Namibia’s;
b. real government expenditure in Botswana is, if anything, still growing 
faster than in Occupied Namibia;
c. Botswana had a far stronger reserve (basically government asset) position 
than Occupied Namibia.
That said, certain of the differences are of interest:
a. Botswana’s government reacted rapidly to an impending crisis, the 
SWA/Namibia regime took at least four years to take the portents 
seriously;
b. Botswana’s response was macro, multi-faceted and - if anything - overly 
energetic while the SWA/Namibia regime's response (in addition to 
internal inconsistencies) has been characterised by fragmentariness, 
limited use of a limited number of instruments and very tentative (as 
well as late) use of those;
c. the Botswana government - based on a fairly firm sub-class coalition and 
conscious of deep and broad support - felt able to act decisively despite 
the fact there would be losers and outcries while the SWA/Namibia 
regime's consciousness of the weakness and shallowness of its domestic 
support and its need to buy a broader sub-class supporting coalition has 
made it hesitant to impose major sacrifices on anyone (not that this has 
meant they were avoided) who might ever support it and rather profligate 
in afterthought subsidies aimed at buying support. (In this case the 
point that a colonial government is almost ipso facto illegitimate can 
explain the difference but there are many indepndent SSA governments 
whose timorousness response and haste to self sabotage their own policies
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is remarkably similar to that of SWA/Namibia.)
Overview
The economy of Namibia"* as of 1985 was:
1. unsatisfactory in output per capita terms;
2. disastrous in output per capita trend;
3. highly skewed and de-integrated in structure;
4. radically inegalitarian as to distribution;
5. characterised by a massive fiscal imbalance;
6. as well as gross mismanagement in the public sector;
7. and lack of confidence by the private sector;
8. vulnerable to a diverse range of exogenous shocks;
9. and with highly problematic future prospects at independence.
The one positive change since 1977 is that the middle and high level citizen 
personpower situation has improved radically. Priority attention to middle 
and high level education and training by the Liberation Movement, and 
expansion by the occupation regime and large companies of education and 
training in Namibia in their attempts to gain black support, have switched 
Namibia from having one of the weakest potential middle and high level 
personnel positions at independence in SSA to a probability of a distinctly
above average position at independence within the Southern African Development
Coordination group of countries relative to population and - indeed - in 
absolute terms at tertiary education level it will be second only to Zimbabwe.
Unsatisfactory economic evolution since 1977 is by no means unique to Namibia.
Many of the nine characteristics are typical of lower middle income, mineral
2export dominated Sub-Saharan economies. South African occupation and the 
Liberation Struggle have exacerbated them. But they are by no means the only 
causes. For that reason at independence Namibia’s public and private sectors 
will face macro economic problems of stabilisation, recovery and renewed 
development witin a context of structural change similar to those of a 
majority of SSA economies as well as the special problems arising from the 
economic heritage of South African occupation and the probability of South 
African economic hostility.
I
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In several respects the 1935 position is sharply divergent from - and worse 
than - that of the late 1970s. In 1977 it would have been possible to 
characterise the economy as:^
1. somewhat unsatisfactory in output per capita;
2. but with a healthy growth trend;
3. highly skewed and de-integrated structurally;
4. radically inegalitarian as to distribution (more so on racial lines but 
much less so among black Namibians than by 1985);
5. with a relatively sound fiscal position;
6. and - except for aspects related to apartheid and - moderately competent 
civil (non-military) public sector management;
7. and mixed but by no means wholly pessimistic private sector views as to 
the future;
8. vulnerable to a diverse range of economic shocks;
9. but with moderately positive economic prospects at independence.
The reasons for the sharp deterioration are fivefold: negative changes in the 
external economic environment; prolonged drought; prolonged war; gross fiscal 
management (flowing from the interactive ’logic' of apartheid and trying to 
buy a black base for it); gross fishery mismanagement.^ The negative changes 
in the external economic environment cannot be expected (at least in Namibia's 
case) to reverse themselves and Namibia's ability to reverse, rather than 
adjust to them, is distinctly limited. The drought has probably ended but 
rebuilding from it will - at best - require half a decade and the termination 
of the war. Similar considerations apply to fishing. The fiscal 
mismanagement and a number of its consequences will pose severe problems of 
rectification even after independence, as will the heritage of two decades of 
war.
These rather unpromising realities do not imply that turning the economy 
around is impossible - indeed Namibia's potential for doing so at independence 
would appear better than that of a majority of SSA economies today. However, 
they do indicate that the requirements of rehabilitation and restructuring are 
high relative to productive resources and capacity available and that the room 
for major mistakes is very limited. In particular a major post-independence 
public and African private consumption boom based on sharp net increases in
4
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public spending and average real wages of Africans would be unsustainable and 
would mortgage Namibia’s economic future for at least a decade.
Analysis of Namibia's macro-economic past, present and future is highly 
problematic for several reasons:
a. data are incomplete and partially roughly estimated - as characteristic 
of all SSA economies but exacerbated in the case of Namibia by certain 
South African political and statistical practices^ and lack of direct 
access to basic data sources and calculations to cross-check published 
figures;
b. the vulnerability to external shocks is very high and external prospects 
both in respect to weather/fish stock recuperation and external trade 
prices/external assistance flows very unclear;
c. severe conceptual and practical problems arise in respect to South 
African budget military expenditure in Namibia (which must have some 
impact on recorded imports, sales and production) and to the South 
African Customs Union system under which much of indirect tax paid is in 
practice included in pre-tax (factor cost) gross domestic product, paid 
to South Africa in the import bill and returned as an external transfer 
(retransfer) payment;
d. the timing, route to, state structure at and South African reaction to 
independence are relevant to macro economic conditions at independence 
and to prospects thereafter, but are not knowable.
Production: Overall Levels and Recent Trends
Adjusting published figures for complete territorial coverage, African 
household produced and consumed goods and services, small scale African 
marketed production and domestic service indicates that 1977 Gross Domestic 
Product at factor prices (excluding indirect taxes and subsidies) was of the 
order of R 1,150 million. In current price terms by 1983 it has risen to 
about R 2,000 million (Tables 4, 5). This apparent increase reverses the 
reality of substantial decline:
a. Namibia's population was of the order of 1,250,000 in 1977 and 1,500,000 
in 1983;
b. prices of components of domestic product had risen 90$ to 95$
c. the prices of the goods used by Namibians had risen on the order of 
110 - 1 2 0 % . 8
Thus while output per person in current price terms - abstracting from 
questions of distribution examined later - rose from R 930 (then equal to over 
US$ 1 ,000) to R 1 ,350 (equivalent to US$ 1,100 at 1983 exchange rates but 
under $650 at those prevailing in early 1985), in constant 1977 prices output 
per capita fell over a fifth from about R 930 to about R 690.
In terms of capacity to purchase the goods and services used by Namibia the 
fall was higher - over 30%. This greater fall in real ability to purchase 
goods and services than of constant price output, results form Namibia’s 
worsening terms of external trade over 1977-83. On average the prices of 
meat, fish, karakul pelts, base metals, diamonds and uranium oxide rose less 
rapidly than those of the goods Namibia imports. The effect is large because 
90% of Namibian production of goods (and a substantial portion of services 
relating to exportables and embodied in the free on board (fob) value of
exports) are in fact exported and about 85% of goods used are imported so that
negative (or positive) terms of trade shifts have a substantial adverse (or
favourable) impact on national command over goods and services including 
imports.
The 30$ to 33$ fall in per capita command over goods and services used in 
Namibia can be divided into about one third from the fall in constant price 
output (down 5$ to 6$), over a half from population growth (or the order of 
20$) and slightly under a third from terms of trade deterioration (of the 
order of 15$ worse). This radical worsening takes per capita command over
real resources back to early 1960s levels. That result, while not uncommon in 
SSA, is deeply unsatisfactory in terms of human and macro economic 
consequences and is bad even by SSA 1977-83 standards. In fact these figures 
may well understate the deterioration because over 1977-83 constant price 
government expenditure per person rose. Excluding this, the decline was of 
the order of 35$ to 40$. The bulk of government expenditure in Namibia 
benefits the white population and a black wage/salary ’elite’ comprising about
7
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10? of black households. Much of it (e.g. array, police) is manifestly 
negative in its welfare impact on the majority of Namibians. Thus the 35? 
decline is probably more relevant to a majority of Namibian households.
Population
A basic set of questions about people and an economy includes how many people 
there are, how old and where they live. They can be summed up in the world 
population official population data for Namibia - as for all colonies - they 
tend to be underestimates both because of colonial lack of interest in 
non-economically active people and the colonised people’s desire to avoid 
being entered on official rosters. In Namibia these factors are very much 
present and are exacerbated by the residence restrictions (which give a 
special reason to avoid being known to the authorities) and the liberation war 
(resulting in Namibians in exile and foreign forces in Namibia).
Subject to that warning, as to accuracy, the Namibian population was about
1,250,000 in 1977, about 1 ,500,000 in 1983 and of the order of 1,600,000 in 
1985 (Table 2). The black Namibian population is growing between 3*2.5% and 
3.5? a year while the resident white population (excluding SADF forces and 
proxies) has declined since 1977. About 60? of Namibian residents live in the 
southern area beyond the ’Police Zone’ and about 10? in the southern 
'Homelands’. Under 5% live on the coast and about 5% in the south (i.e. South 
of Windhoek District). Slightly over 20? live in the centre. Slightly over a 
quarter of Namibians are urban and peri urban residents and slightly under 
three quarters rural (Table 3). About 51-52? of black Namibians are female 
and 51-52? under 17 years of age. It should be stressed that all of these 
figures are subject to substantial error margins.
Economic Structure Skewness and Non-Integration
Namibia's economy is centred on cattle, sheep, fish, copper-lead-zinc,
diamonds and uranium oxide. These account directly for about a third of 
0output. However, this understates their importance as their processing is 
central to manufacturing and they are major consumers of non-governmental 
services. Including these indirect contributions brings their total
Ik 4»
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proportion of output to about one half.
Furthermore, the bulk of other non-governmental production and expenditure is 
based on the incomes generated in the core productive sectors and the related 
sectors. Even in a year of poor prices and profits for core sectors such as 
1983 they contributed directly perhaps a fifth of gross domestic government 
revenue adjusted for the customs and excise retransfer. The bulk of the 
remainder of that revenue represents indirect taxation on purchases out of 
incomes generated by them.
On the face of it the 1983 GDP (Tables 4, 5) distribution looks less skewed 
than 1977 when the core sectors accounted directly for about half of GDP. 
Unfortunately this appearance is partly deceptive and, to the extent it is 
real, arises from core sector contraction more rapid than that in the rest of 
the economy not rapid expansion of other sectors. Prices of beef and fish 
products have risen less rapidly than inflation as have those of base metals, 
and in recent years, diamonds. Karakul prices in 1983 had not regained 1977 
nominal levels (a real price fall of over 50*) and those of uranium oxide were 
little better, even though until 1984 their short term effect was limited by 
continuing term contracts.
Therefore, the fall in share of current price output is partly the domestic 
reflection of the worsening external terms of trade experienced by the core 
sectors. In addition their real output has fallen: over 50$ for agriculture 
and fishing and over 20* for mining (dominated by a cut of about one half in 
diamond production)^ There has not been diversification into other sectors 
but rather severe drought, war and price related declines in the volume and 
real value of the output of the core directly productive sectors.
The highly non-integrated nature of the Namibian economy is illustrated by its 
external trade statistics (Tables 9,10). Exports of goods and services in 
1983 were of the order of R 1 ,025 million or 50$ of Gross Domestic Product. 
However, in respect to agriculture, fishing, mining and manufacturing 
(adjusting for embodied services) they were of the order of R 750 million of 
R 810 million or over 90*. For all physical output (including water, 
electricity and construction) about 80$ were exported. Imports of goods and 
services (excluding interest and dividends) were of the order of R 1,175 
million or about three fifths of total domestic production. j_n terms 01
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domestic use of goods (excluding services) the share is of the order of 85$ 
(nearly 90$ excluding goods produced and consumed in the same household.) The
only substantial linkages with the Namibian economy are from core export 
production into export processing/manufacturing, from water and electricity 
and services into export production and movement and from imports into
services for their distribution. In short Namibia remains a stereotype of the 
economy which produces what it does not use and uses what it does not produce 
- a situation not substantially altered over 1977-83.
Core employment sagged from about 187,500 in 1977 to 176,000 in 1983. The 
labour force grew from 500,000 to 600,000 but the increase was largely pushed 
into low productivity informal and small agricultural self employment and into 
unemployment."11 In the context of a 20$ population increase combined with 
drought and general economic decline this implies sharp rises in open 
unemployment, and underemployment (especially in informal and peasant
sectors). It also means increased income inequality and an increase in the
percentage of households below any realistic absolute poverty line.
Income Inequality
Namibia in 1977 may well have had the most unequally distributed income in the 
12world. While 1983 inequality is probably somewhat less at least on racial 
lines, estimation suggests a 12 to 1 differential between white and black 
household incomes and a 6 to 1 differential between those of a 10-15$ ’elite’ 
of black household and those of the mass of the black population. The average 
incomes for these three groups are respectively R 20,000, R 6,000, R 1,000.
The basic cause of inequality is the income distribution logic of apartheid 
(including privileged access to skills, jobs, capital and other resources). 
That of the ’black' inequality - which in its present form is basically a post 
1980 phenomenon - is the South African strategy of seeking to buy black 
support.
This strategy has been pursued both by the occupation regime and certain large 
employers (notably the three major mining companies and two main banks).
The broad socio-political and political economic implications of a combination
t  0
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of high inequality along overlapping race and sub-class lines, falling average 
real household incomes and unequal access (including rare or virtually none in 
many rural areas and very little except for primary education for a majority
i qof black workers and peasants) to basic services are clear.
a. absolute (and deepening) poverty for about 60% of households;
b. very poor health resulting from poverty (e.g. nutrition) and 
environmental (e.g. lack of access to pure water) as well as poor medical 
services for most black Namibians;
c. a mixed class/race oriented antagonistic political economic contradiction 
between the vast majority of black Namibians and the majority of white 
residents (the class/race mix is the result of apartheid which uses race 
to reinforce class power and profit);
d. a latent sub-class or class contradiction within the black community 
combined with an antagonistic one on political allegiance (liberation 
movement vs ’Botha’s bought boys’) cleavages;
e. and serai latent contradictions among settler, South African State and 
corporate political economic (sub-class) interests within the white 
group.
The use of the term ’workers and peasants” is particularly appropriate in 
Namibia. The ’contract” system - on which the colonial Namibian economy was 
built - guaranteed that most peasant males would at times have to be wage 
workers and vice versa. Therefore even at individual level, and certainly at 
household or extended family and social formation, the largest class is 
worker/peasant (including a female fraction).
That the ’contract’ system in its pure form was operated most rigidly in 
respect to northern Namibia is a significant part of the explanation for the 
earlier rise of modern political consciousuness and mass mobilisation both in 
the north and among ’contract’ workers nationally. Just as 'contract' built 
the colonial Namibian economy it has created the contradictions which have 
doomed it. By linking workers and peasants by creating a national system of 
’contract’ workers (who could and did reach out to their ’Police Zone’ class 
counterparts), by isolating workers in compounds which also provided a place 
for self organisation it made creation of national liberation consciousness 
and its organised movement less difficult. And by making the link between 
specific grievances and the overall political economy of South African
% *
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occupation blatantly obvious it has speeded the transformation from
concentration on reforms of particular aspects of deprivation and repression 
to struggle for basic transformation of the political and economic power 
structures, rapid because worker/peasant consciousness quickly rose to make 
the links between specific manifestations and the overall system. In 
addition, until very recently objective black sub-class differences were small 
while cleavages on intra black sub-class lines detracting from national 
political mobilisation remain limited.
Clearly changes are necessary at independence for macro economic as well as
political and socio economic reasons. The present levels of rural income will
if unchanged lead both to a mass exodus to urban areas which could not provide
either urban services or meaningful employment and the destruction of the
actual and potential rural economic base. The approximately 60* of households
14in absolute poverty is not a status quo with which an independent Namibia 
could live socially or politically.
However, very real constraints exist either to massive income redistribution
away from the white group and the black ’elite* or to levelling mass black
incomes up to the R 6,000 level of the black ’elite*. The former could lead
to rapid departure of middle and high level white personpower before
replacements could be trained. New imported expatriates would be even more
expensive unless on technical assistance terms. It would also, at the least,
lead to productivity (loss of morale), commitment and political problems in
terms of black ’elite' members in health, education, mining and other key
15economic sectors. Their absolute incomes ($2,000-6,000) are not
extravagant. The majority are not in any way politically pro-South Africa or 
disloyal to Namibia; their skills and commitment are critical. The latter 
route of levelling up would lead to rapid overheating, widened fiscal and 
external gaps and national economic bankruptcy.
Fiscal Allocation and Imbalance
In 1983/84 estimated central revenue fund expenditure was R 1,036 million or 
over 55% of probable official GDP estimates (Table 11). Adjusting for second 
tier (ethnic) administration and Walvis Bay budget items not met out of the 
central revenue fund (especially the white authority's income tax and ohe
% « -14-
urban authorities’ rates, rents and user charges) the probable total estimate 
is of the order of R 1,200 - 1,250 million or somewhat under 6055 of estimated 
adjusted GDP of about R 2,100 million. These are astoundingly high ratios
especially for a relatively poor country - 2555 to 30% is more typical of SSA.
They are in fact not sustainable at those levels out of Namibian production.
The expenditure pattern is - to say the least - highly unusual.^ Over k0% is 
expended on administration narrowly defined; about 2055 on fiscal 
administration, subsidies, and debt services and 1 2 5% to 1 5% on defence and 
police (excluding RSA budget expenditure). Social and economic services 
appear, at most, to account for 25-30  ^ of total governmental spending even 
including items contained in second tier budgets. Similarly in 1983/84 wage 
and expenditure out of the Central Revenue Fund Budget is believed to have 
been of the order of R 600 million ( 6055 of spending) and total governmental 
wages and salaries (including Walvis Bay, second tier and municipal
authorities) perhaps R 625 million (also 60% odd of overall non-capital 
spending). These are very high shares. A 3055 to 4055 range is more typical 
even in SSA where government employee incomes are high relative to average 
output (or income) per person and, as a result, relative to total government 
spending.
The explanation lies in the very large transfers to second tier ethnic 
authorities (R 285 million in 1983/84) and the high wages and salaries 
relative to GDP per capita paid both to white and black employees. The 
apparent makeup of the wages and salaries bill (including some fringe 
benefits) in 1983/84 was over 20,000 whites at an average of just under R
20,000 each and 50,000 black Namibians at an average of perhaps R 4,000.
Within the latter groups perhaps 10,000 constituted a black elite with average 
incomes of about R 6,000. This contrasts with a guesstimated average income 
of all other black households of about R 1,000 and with annual wages of R 
400-1,500 in most enterprise sectors other than large scale manufacturing, 
mining parastatals and finance.
Basic social and economic services - beyond primary education in areas not 
affected by the war - cannot be provided to the entire population out of the 
present budget for three reasons: first the disproportionate share on
administration; second the very high wage and salary scales relative to output 
per person and third the disproportionate concentration on providing high
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quality services to the 6-7% white minority (e.g. about 5 to 1 in difference 
in expenditure per enrolled child between white and black public education in 
1982/83).
Revenue from domestic sources in 1983/84 was probably of the order of R 750 
million (including personal income tax collected by the white second tier, 
rates and fees, the customs and excise transfer and Walvis Bay). At 37i% of 
domestic production this is a very high level for a poor or lower middle 
income territory, although the highly profitable diamond/uranium sector does 
provide scope for a higher ratio of government revenue to output than is 
normally the case.
The financing gap of the order of R 500 million is also - at 25% of GDP - very 
large. About R 250 million comes from South Africa (over half for ’defence' 
and police) and R 250 million from ’loans’. A financing requirement of R 
125-175 million from external loans and grants and R 100-150 million from 
domestic borrowing - totalling R 225-325 million for capital and a small 
portion of recurrent spending would not be unusual for a country like Namibia. 
R 500 million financing - all external - is a most unusual level.
Comparisons with 1977 are difficult because the division of expenditure
17between RSA and territorial heads and between tiers has changed sharply. 
Allowing for that, expenditure in 1977 was probably about R 350 or 30Í of GDP. 
Implicit Revenue including an estimate of what customs and excise should have 
been probably was of the order of R 250-300 million leaving a balance of R 
50-100 million covered by RSA primarily in respect to military heads 
subsequently shifted to the territorial budget and secondarily in respect to 
capital expenditure. The sharp deterioration in the revenue/expenditure gap 
relates both to the decline in the territorial economy since 1977 and to the 
sharp increases in real wages and salaries and second tier transfers as part 
of RSA's 'buy a bantustan' strategy.
A deficit related to that of the government is that of the railway. (e.g. the 
Namibian operations of SATS - South African Transport Services.) The railway 
reported a 1983/84 loss of R 90 million up from R 70 million in 1981/82 and 
perhaps R 20 million in 1977. While these asserted losses appear to include 
capital expenditure and overheads spent outside Namibia, very little beyond 
replacement has been done since 1980, so that the apparent position is R 120
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raillion odd operating revenue (on perhaps 4.5 to 5) million tonnes total
1 8freight and R 210 million odd operating and replacement expenditure.
A railway deficit approaching 5$ of gross domestic product is both a macro
economic and a fiscal policy problem. At present this deficit is part of
overall SATS losses, covered by RSA. Were Namibia independent it would fall
on the government to fill the gap (as it does in Zimbabwe which has a similar
1Qabsolute deficit but in relation to a much larger traffic volume and GDP).
Occupied Namibia's irresponsible fiscal policy has a very limited effect on 
inflation but a mildly positive one on short run Gross Domestic Product. 
These results arise from the fact that to date the deficit has been externally 
financed - by transfers by the South African state and by loans from South 
African financial institutions guaranteed by the South African state.
Given the slack in the Namibian economy the additional purchases out of the 
excess spending which go largely on wages and salaries plus imported goods 
have no marked inflationary impact since they do not involve local borrowing 
and are funded in a way generating cover for additional imports. Were the 
rest of the economy healthier, the added spending would probably create 
bottlenecks in respect to services and construction and thus be inflationary. 
As it is, Namibia's rate of inflation depends almost wholly on that of South 
Africa transmitted by imports from South Africa and South African monetary 
policy.
Namibia under South African occupation has no monetary policy. This is true 
by definition since it has neither a currency of its own nor a central bank. 
It is affected by South African monetary policy including high interest rates 
and the plummeting external value of the Rand which fell almost 70$ relative 
to the USA between mid-1977 and mid-August 1985. Both of these factors are 
inflationary while the higher interest rates discourage private sector 
investment. Financial institutions in Namibia are historically highly liquid 
- their Namibian deposits far exceed Namibian lending with the balance held 
with Johannesburg bank head offices, lent to South African borrowers or 
invested in South African government securities. Therefore the effective 
restrictiveness of South African monetary policy in respect to would be 
Namibian borrowers turns primarily on the overdraft rate (over 20$ in late 
1984 and 1985) rather than on credit ceilings or a shortage of bank liquidity.
* f
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The Namibian economy has been grossly mismanaged. Even in the narrowest 
public finance terms, the multiple tier administration wage increase, 
administration expansion policies of 1977-83, in the face of a declining 
economic base, must be judged among the world's most irresponsible. Indeed 
they have been characterised as corrupt, wasteful, incompetent and an 
unbearable burden by the RSA’s Thirion Commission of Inquiry and its own 
Finance Secretary in Windhoek as well as by voices in the Namibian (white) 
private sector.^
Similarly (but for a much longer period) ecological (e.g. preservation of 
grazing land and of fish stocks and overseeing of mineral resource use) and 
financial (e.g. mining tax and related issues in relation to both mining and 
fishing) management have been very weak. In part this has been lack of 
foresight and attention to development of proper territorial resource 
management approaches. The revenue and output losses certainly do not benefit 
the white community or the fiscal balance of Namibia and many are also 
negative from a South African state perspective.
However, the fiscal and resource mismanagement is ultimately more deeply based 
in apartheid and the attempt to hold Namibia as an occupied territory or - at 
worst (from an RSA perspective) - a neo-colony. To this end both prudent 
resource management (especially where it conflicted with settler or TNC 
interest) and fiscal sanity have repeatedly been compromised or sacrificed 
(e.g. in the ’buy a bantustan’ approach).
The private enterprise sector in Namibia - both settler and TNC - has an
extreme lack of confidence in the territorial economy's future and (perhaps
more directly to the point) about there being a profitable role for them in 
21it. This is exemplified not merely in words but even more in the very low 
and declining levels of private enterprise investment (and even that of most
state enterprises) since the late 1970s. The concerns are fourfold:
a. the risks of the war situation;
b. the uncertainty of their position when it ends and of the role - if any -
an independent Namibian state will allot them;
c. the fiscal madness pursued by the occupation authorities (especially in
Mismanagement and Lack of Confidence
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respect to bantustan creation and high cost 'external borrowing');
d. the adverse economic circumstances confronting export oriented primary 
production, both in general and with particular respect to Namibia.
Independence and an end to violence as well as a clear (stated and 
operational) government policy in respect to them are preconditions to
reversing the first three causes of lack of confidence while improved 
territorial economic performance and primary producer economic climate
(including improved world prices) is needed to remedy the last.
In respect to state macro-economic management and to enterprise confidence 
(and investment in maintaining and expanding production) there has been rapid 
deterioration since 1977. The fiscal, administrative and natural resource 
preservation positions have become radically worse and the 1977 mix of caution 
and moderate optimism of the enterprise sector has turned into deep concern 
for their future survival combined in most cases (the three main mining 
companies are to a degree exceptions) with deep pessimism.
Vulnerability and Prognosis
As 1977-85 demonstrated, the Namibian economy is highly vulnerable to external 
shocks and only slightly less so to state economic mismanagement and 
enterprise lack of confidence. This vulnerability was relatively masked in 
1977; the drought had just begun; base metal prices while not good seemed to 
be recovering; diamond and uranium oxide prospects were favourable; fishing 
seemed to be recovering; the fiscal position was sound; GDP had been growing 
moderately rapidly in real terms for a decade and a half/ In 1985 it is only 
too starkly apparent: a seven year drought is (perhaps) just ended; fish
stocks have collapsed for the two traditional main species; diamond prices
have been sustained but only at the cost of an output cut of over 50%; the 
prices of most other exports have - compared to production costs and to prices 
in general - performed very poorly with significant recovery to date only in 
the case of karakul; the fiscal position is a shambles as are administration 
and public services.
In 1977 the degree of stability and margins of safety on the macro economic 
side (setting aside the course of the Liberation Struggle which then appeared
* *
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to the occupation regime and to the private sector far less immediately 
threatening to macro economic management and performance than it does today) 
were clearly overestimated while vulnerability was underestimated. In 1985 
the reverse may be the case. The core of the directly productive economy and 
of the infrastructure have not collapsed and the exogenous downside risk to 
them over 1985-93 can hardly be as great as over 1977-82.
The implicit assumptions behind projections indicating continued macro 
economic decline of unending administrative and fiscal mismanagement, 
uncertainty and war can be reversed by independence, peace (a separate 
condition from independence as the cases of Angola and Mozambique 
demonstrate), prudent fiscal management and a coherent rehabilitation and 
development strategy which shows initial signs of achievement.
However, the transition to independence will entail new vulnerabilities. A 
checklist of old and new macro economic danger areas follows with more 
detailed comments and indications of macro economic measure to limit or 
overcome them contained in the concluding sections, as well as in the sectoral 
chapters.
1. weather - Namibia is subject to drought cycles;
2. range deterioration/desert encroachment - a long term trend accelerated 
by the drought;
3. fish stocks - while limited downside risk remains, recovery is uncertain;
4. base metal and uranium oxide prices - again with little downside risk but 
uncertain recovery prospects;
5. diamond volume - dependent on market recovery at moderately rising 
prices;
6. karakul prices - dependent on fashion and ecology attitudes to sustain 
1983-84 recovery;^
7. beef market access - to replace RSA market;
8. restoring herds - dependent on finance and confidence;
9. unmanageable fiscal and external deficits - from continuation of present 
trends or a post-independence boom;
10. loss of skilled personnel - before adequate numbers of Namibians can be 
trained;
11. administrative and service breakdowns - from personnel loss or ill
designed restructuring;
#
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12. loss of external access from South African interference with the rail 
link to RSA ports and/or with Walvis Bay after independence combined with 
failure to redirect traffic off the line to RSA and develop adequate 
Namibian port facilities;
13. South African economic destabilisation - from costly through macro 
economically destructive (e.g. over the recent Zimbabwe to Mozambique 
range).
This formidable list of vulnerabilities cannot be taken to mean that 
structural or institutional changes - as represented by the political economy 
of liberation - are either undesirable or impossible. Indeed the relationship 
of these vulnerabilities to the production and ownership patterns of the 
Namibian economy is such as to suggest that radical change is needed to 
diversify production, increase domestic economic linkages and reduce external 
factor payments. What the vulnerabilities do is to make such changes harder 
to achieve because of uncertainty of and fluctuations in resources available.
Namibian Production - A Review
Although estimates of Namibian territorial production exist from 1920 onward
(Table 4), considerable problems arise in using them to determine output
levels and trends. Their accuracy, coverage and methodology varies and is
open to serious question in each case. In addition, no adequate price series
- critical for estimating physical output changes and territorial purchasing
power (volume adjusted for changes in external terms of trade) - exist for
territorial production, exports or imports. Despite this, broad statements as
to levels and trends are possible and the adjusted GDP figures presented for
241977 and 1983 are probably well within 10% of being correct - a position no 
worse than the typical SSA national accounts case.
A brief review of main sources of estimates and their limitations follows as a 
preface to a sketch of historic trends and a presentation of estimated 1977 
and 1983 gross national accounts.
1920-1945 estimates are from an analysis by a South African academician based 
on a variety of historic data. The quality and coverage are clearly
relatively low and the methodology unclear. 1946-1960 estimates are from the
* *
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Odendaal Report and appear to be roughly plausible subject to coverage 
problems for household consumed and uncounted small scale commercial 
production, judging from comparison with an academic analysis based on access 
to official South African sources.
From 1975 reasonably consistent official estimates of current and constant 
price GDP exist. The problems with them relate to:
a. coverage - exclusion of producing household used (subsistence) output, 
undercounting of enterprise produced and used inputs of small scale 
commercial activity and of domestic service and exclusion of Walvis Bay;
b. accuracy of estimates - relatively low in respect to all data not tied to 
the government budget, export or parastatal and large corporation reports 
and highly uncertain in respect to price deflators;
c. methodology - not systematically biased on basic accounts but fairly 
rough and ready (inevitable in SSA) and not publicly available for 
analysis in any detail.
Revisions of the series from time to time reflect these weaknesses and suggest 
that all data must be treated with caution.
The 1977 figures prepared as background to UNIN manpower research‘d  did not
have the benefit of access to official data, published or otherwise. 
Adjusting for coverage, they are comparable in size to the official estimate, 
albeit they have relatively more agriculture and manufacturing and less mining 
than can be accounted for by coverage adjustments.
* 26 The UNIN related income distribution research carried out by the ILO
suggests higher consumption levels than official estimates (albeit this
depends very much on assumptions as to savings and remittances) which suggest
either overestimation of incomes in the income estimation data used or
underestimation of some elements of production in official data and different
territorial coverage in the 1975 survey data from that in the official
accounts. All of these are quite likely.
The 1983 estimates used in the opening section and used in tables to this 
chapter are based on the official estimates for 1983 with adjustments to:
a. agriculture (and also factor payments) for which the 1982-83 decline is
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so large as to suggest an incomplete initial estimate;
b. Walvis Bay which is excluded from the official series because South
Africa includes it in RSA, not Namibian, GDP estimates;
c. household production for own use, small scale commerical production and
domestic service which appear to be omitted or underestimated.
The 1977 data used for broad 1977-33 comparison purposes are those of the work 
done as background to UNIN manpower research.
The 1977 GDP on this basis is R 1,135 million and the 1983 R 2,000 million at 
current prices (R 1,050 million odd in 1977 prices). The broad orders of 
magnitude and the downward trend over 1977-1983 have been set out above 
together with the main characteristics of its skewed structure.
Historically, Namibia’s domestic production was very small absolutely and per
27capita until the middle of the 1940s. The white enclave under German rule 
consisted of a very limited cattle - base metal - diamond sector. African 
subsistence production - then as now - was low absolutely and per capita. In 
the 1920s there was some growth - dominated by mining - but in the 1930s GDP 
collapsed as the base metal mining sector, and for a time, diamonds closed 
down and ranch output value fell by almost three quarters.
The situation changed rapidly from the mid-1940s as base metal production
reopened and expanded rapidly, diamonds boomed, the fishing industry became
substantial and ranching (including for a time dairying) also achieved
substantial growth. Over the period 1945 through 1956 constant price GDP
2 8appears to have grown about 12Í (9% per capita) a year. As terms of trade 
0swings over this period were largely favourable, the probable annual per 
capita rate of growth of purchasing power over resources used by the Namibian 
economy may well have exceeded 10%.
This initial ’opening up boom” (characteristic of most SSA economies but at
very different dates from the 1 890s in Ghana to the 1960s in the Ivory Coast
and the 1970s in Botswana) was based on the rapid growth from a very low base
of a limited number of primary export products. This phase ended with a fall
in GDP (and a worsening of the terms of trade) in 1957-59» Over those years
constant price GDP fell by over a tenth with the sharpest proportionate falls
pqm  agriculture and fishing.
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Frorn 1960 through 1977 another period of fairly rapid GD? growth; but at rates
substantially lower than 1945-57, ensued. Constant price production rose
about 5.5$ a year (2.5% per capita) - significantly above the average SSA rate
30but by no means uniquely high. On the whole terms of trade do not appear to 
have had any marked trend during this period so that real command over goods 
and services used probably grew at about the same rate as GDP.
Over 1977-83 constant price GDP has fallen about 6% - say 1$ a year or 4$ per 
capita per annum. The latest revised figures show declines in 1978, 1980 and 
1983, virtual stagnation in 1979 and 1982 and some growth in 1981. Excluding 
general government 1978, 1980, 1981 and 1983 all show declines.^1 The
negative terms of trade shifts increasing the rate of fall of ability to 
purchase goods and services used in Namibia and the causal factors behind the 
overall decline have been presented in the previous section.
Gross fixed capital formation (investment) estimates for Namibia are high 
relative to GDP even in 1983 even though in constant price terms there has 
been a fall of slightly over one third from 1977 to 1983 - R 305 million 1977 
and R 195 million 1983 in 1977 prices ( 1983 R 395 million in 1983 prices) 
adjusting gross capital formation for coverage comparable to adjusted domestic 
production.
The 1977 GFCF estimate is about 30$ of adjusted GDP and the 1983 just under 
20*. These are on the face of it plausible rates especially for 1977 which 
was marked by substantial investment in the Rossing and Ruacana projects. The 
1983 figure is surprisingly high, not so much in respect to government and 
parastatal investment which has been three fifths to two thirds virtually 
consistently since 1970, but in respect to private sector investment. 
However, by 1983 depreciation of existing capital stock accounted for almost 
80$ of GFCF bringing net fixed capital formation down to 4$ of GDP (versus 18$ 
in 1977). Thus, if one assumes most enterprise investment was asset 
replacement (including prospecting in respect to minerals) the data are 
plausible.
Official capital stock estimated for Namibia exist but appear to be 
significantly too high with an unadjusted (for capacity utilisation) ratio of 
over 4 and an adjusted one of over 3*5 in 1977. Per contra official
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Assuming a 1977 capacity utilisation ratio of 90% and an adjusted capital 
output ratio of 2.7 (unadjusted 3*0), a depreciation rate of 3.5% and an 
annual increase in capital stock cost of 12.5%, the 1977 capital stock was 
R3,410 and the 1983 R 8,931 (R 4,400 million in 1977 prices). The latter 
figure implies a 1983 capacity utilisation ratio of 60% and a real growth rate 
of capital stock of slightly over 4$ a year. (Table 7).
While these estimates are open to serious question, they do seem roughly
32consistent with somewhat more solidly based estimates from Zimbabwean data. 
The 60% output/capacity ratio is certainly consistent with the known fall in 
GDP and the general state of the economy in 1983. However, the definition of 
capacity in respect to agriculture and fisheries assumes good weather and 
’normal’ middle 1970s fish stocks - as well as the absence of war - so that 
demand increases alone could not restore output in those sectors quite apart 
from budgetary and balance of payment considerations.
By 1983 state gross fixed investment exceeded total net fixed investment. 
That is enterprise investment was less than depreciation - especially for the 
private sector of the order of 60% of all fixed capital in Namibia is state 
owned but this is concentrated in transportation and communications, water and 
state ownership role in manufacturing and mining relatively small and in 
ranching and fishing, as well as commerce, quite low.
Namibia has had a very high gross territorial savings rate over most of the 
past two decades. Indeed the official Statistical/Economic Review for 1983 ^  
argues that the rate was 37% in 1983 and that "over the past fourteen years, 
domestic saving was on the whole sufficient to finance total investment and 
still leave a surplus of almost R 500 million" - a rather revealing admission 
from a regime claiming Namibia to be bankrupt. The Review attributes the 
combination of surplus domestic savings and substantial use of external 
capital to the fact that savings are sent to the "nearest" capital market 
(South Africa) and then borrowed or invested back.
This pattern is one of private savings in excess of private investment with 
the balance largely transmitted directly or via the banking system to South 
Africa. On the other hand government investment normally substantially
depreciation estimates of 2% of capital stock are too low.
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exceeds the recurrent budget surplus (by definition now that the recurrent 
budget is in deficit and government savings negative). The balance is 
borrowed abroad - largely from the same RSA banks to whom the Namibian private 
sector surplus savings go.
Attractive as this explanation - which, ironically, is a textbook example of 
the Mirija (bloodsucking) interpretation of colonial investment presumably 
presented without understanding its implications - may be, the post 1979 
position is not exactly as represented.
For example, in 1983 government and railways transfer receipts (net of customs 
and excise retransfers) were of the order of R 350 million. Subtracting this 
figure from the official estimate of domestic savings R 610 million leaves 
only R 260 million (adjusted perhaps R 285-290 million) against investment of 
R 359 million (adjusted R 395 million) for an investment/savings deficit of R 
90 million (adjusted R 105 million) odd.
In 1977, however, net transfers were negligible (adjusted for the customs and 
excise retransfer at its fall level which was not, in fact, paid). Therefore, 
in that year domestic savings adjusted for governmental and railways transfers 
did exceed fixed investment by perhaps 20$, on the basis of official savings 
(after recorded dividends and interest payments) data.
Similarly it is clear that the offical estimates of factor payments (recorded 
interest and dividends) seriously understate total transfers out of income. 
The difference - made up of profit remittances by branches and unincorporated 
enterprises, remittances out of wages and salaries, increase in Namibian 
financial institution net claims abroad, increase in circulation of (South 
African) currency and unrecorded dividends and interest probably totalled at 
least R 200 million in 1983. If so this would have reduced effective domestic 
savings available for domestic investment, external debt repayment and capital 
flight to under R 100 million. All of that apparently was in fact absorbed in 
external debt reduction and capital flight reducing the effective financing of 
Namibian GFCF out of territorial savings to 0. (See Table 9)
As outlined in subsequent sections, this situation could be substantially 
improved by fiscal reform. Similarly capital account exchange control and 
limits on the allowable factor payments/remittances could reduce outflow on
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that head. It is, however, unlikely that a GFCF rate of 25$ of GDP - R 500 
million odd in 1983 prices - could be financed at independence totally out of 
domestic savings. On the face of it R 300 - R 350 domestic savings (including 
perhaps R 200-250 million government and parastatal savings net of railways 
losses) net of remittances/factor payments (15$ to 17?$ of GDP) could be 
mobilised leaving an external financing requirement of R 150-200 million (7s$ 
to 10$ of GDP).
Gross national product is defined as GDP (product produced in a country) less 
income accruing to nationals of another country. In Namibia’s case the most 
practical method of estimating it is to substract recorded factor payments and 
other remittances (other than loan repayment and capital flight) from GDP. In 
general developing countries have GNP smaller than GDP because they are net 
borrowers, net hosts to foreign equity capital and net users (at least in 
total wage/salary bill terms) of expatriate personnel who make substantial 
remittances. Lesotho is an exception because its dominant economic activity 
is to export labour to South Africa, but the general SSA pattern is of one GDP 
5$ to 15$ below GNP (with certain economies based on externally developed 
natural resource enclaves - e.g. Gabon - significantly higher).
In Namibia’s case the GNP-GDP differences have been much wider (Table 3). 
While in 1946 about 8$ of GDP was remitted, by 1956 the figure had risen to 
40$ as the very high profit 'opening up boom' peaked. It fell to perhaps 25$ 
in 1969 rising to 375 at the peak of the second sustained growth period in 
1977. With the severe slump in output - and especially profits - since 1977, 
the apparent outflow has fallen to R320-400 million or 16-20$ of GDP; a 
remarkably high rate for a severely depressed economy.
The reasons for this pattern are quite clear. First, the mineral sector is 
dominated by foreign (largely South African and British) corporations which 
receive and remit high profits except in depression years. The same is true 
of fishing. Second, unincorporated business surpluses and the salary bill 
largely go to resident expatriates and white settlers who tend to save/invest 
in their 'home' countries (dominantly South Africa) not Namibia.
Namibia's labour market is highly fragmented by race and by skill. Expatriate 
and settler white incomes were and are based on South African rates plus a 
markup for Namibia's higher cost of living. These wages and salaries do to
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some extent reflect supply and demand but in RSA not Namibia. Until the 1970s 
the black labour market was artificial and homogenous and could virtually be 
summed up in the two terms "labour reserve economy" and "contract" as outlined 
above. Slightly different factors applied to "police zone" black labourers 
but overall the system was one which paid sub-subsistence wages by forcing 
dependents to remain on 'reserves’ and produce some of their subsistence 
there. Cape Coloured - and to a lesser degree Rehoboth - workers filled an 
intermediate niche filling semi-skilled and clerical/sub-professional jobs 
again paid roughly comparable to South African coloured rates - well above 
black but a fraction of white.
This basically dual market has become more fragmented over the last decade. 
Employers needing a semi-skilled and skilled, stable labour force and seeing 
employee loyalty as a hedge against future risks have sharply raised the wages 
of about a tenth of employed black Namibians. The government - largely in
seeking to create a bantustan and middle class black support group has done
the same for comparable numbers. Both have significantly broadened the range 
of occupations and skill levels performed by black Namibians albeit at the top 
(professional and managerial) only teachers and nurses are exceptions to 
complete white dominance.
The reasons for the shift are different for the two sets of employers: the
enterprises did seek primarily to set a cost efficient wage (one above 
subsistence and encouraging de facto continuity of employment and acquisition 
of skills) and only secondarily to buy loyalty. The government was primarily 
concerned with creating a black group (sub-class) with a state in the system 
and, perhaps, secondarily with the impracticability of securing enough white 
personnel especially in teaching and nursing. Smaller employers neither need 
nor can afford a higher productivity/higher wage black labour force and the 
government still has low wages for unskilled black employees so that 
fragmentation has created a number of skill and employer defined parallel 
sub-markets for labour.
In none of the markets are Namibian trade unions a significant force in wage
determination. White Union branches exist but as wages are basically RSA plus
there is little real local negotiation on pay. Black trade unions have been - 
and are forcibly suppressed before they can become effective in affecting the 
structure and results of the labour market. As a result black workers have
4
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increasingly come to see national liberation as a precondition for meaningful 
economic issue oriented trade unionism.
Income Distribution: Patterns and Problems
Income distribution cannot be separated from production. What is produced, by 
whom and in which patterns of production and industrial relations largely 
determines income distribution. Similarly the pattern of income distribution 
affects what goods are demanded domestically and - less fully in a very 
externally oriented economy like that of Namibia - produced.
Therefore income distribution policy in independent Namibia will need to go 
beyond wage salary, tax and ownership policies. If the incomes of households 
in small scale agriculture and the artisinal/informal sectors are to be raised 
above the absolute poverty line emphasis must be placed on assisting these 
households and household or small scale enterprises to produce more.
Household income also includes communal goods - e.g. health, education, water 
and other services produced and distributed either free or at charges well 
below cost by the state. Both the quantity of such services (e.g. universal 
primary education and health care) and the types (e.g. urban hospitals vs 
rural clinics and front line health workers) can influence income distribution 
significantly.
Estimating income distribution in Namibia is exceedingly difficult - data are 
either approximate, fragmentary or politically biased. In this area - unlike 
macro economic data in general - offical data suffer not simply from 
underestimating the population (which is in itself partly political) and 
difficulties of covering household production for own use and self employment 
output, plus domestic and small enterprise employees (a low wage group) but 
also from fairly evident political selectivity. These difficulties are 
explored in greater detail in the Income Distribution chapter. However, for 
macro economic purposes a substantial area of common ground does exist:
1. income distribution is among the most - and possibly the most - unequal 
in the world;
2. the dominant cause of the inquality is racial with estimates of white to
*
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black income ratios ranging from 8 to over 40 to 1;
3. however, within the black population a 50,000 household elite has been 
created, largely since 1980, with probable incomes dominantly in the R 
4,000-12,500 range (vs an average of R 20,000 odd for whites) comprising 
perhaps 15/6 of black households and half of black incomes;"
4. in addition within the black income distribution there is a sharp
division between black urban and rural household incomes - probably of
the order of 3 to 1 excluding the ’elite* group;
5. however, all estimates are rendered very approximate because of serious 
problems in defining households as a result of the contract labour system 
(which divides households) and the large number of female headed 
households including children (e.g. probably dominant in petty trade and 
domestic service as well as in many rural areas).
A 1977 estimate prepared as background to the UNIN manpower study^ suggested 
white/black inequality per capita of the order of 20 to 25 to 1. Its 
estimates of average formal sector black wages - on non-random and incomplete 
data - were about one quarter of the 1975 estimates.
As of 1983 the racial discrepancies were somewhat narrower - probably 12 to 1 
- despite a recent press estimate of R 18,000 to R 450 white/black average
household income, a ratio of 40 to 1 (more plausibly R 18,000 to R 650-700 or
over 25 to 1 adjusting for subsistence, small commercial and wages in kind
income). At the same time intra black differentials have risen sharply. The 
two movements have a basic common cause - the creation of a black ’elite’ 
wage/salary group of perhaps 40,000 employees (say 20,000 government; 
10-12,500 mines, 7,500-10,000 finance, public utilities including railways and 
large scale commerce and manufacturing) and perhaps 10,000 self employed, 
including small businessmen, professionals, internal 'party leaders’, the 
Rehoboth ranching elite and 'traditional elites in homelands'. This group has 
average household incomes largely in the R 4,000-12,500 range and averaging 
about R 6,000 versus perhaps R 1,000 for other black households.
Excluding remittances,^ rural ’subsistence’ farming household income is 
unlikely to average more than R 400-500 even including commercial sales given 
the damage inflicted by drought and war. Those of urban households (usually 
female headed) in domestic service and petty trade are unlikely to average 
over R 500-600.
»
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Very rough estimates from adjusted 1983 GDP suggest that 40,000 white
households had incomes from all sources totalling on the order of R 800-850
million (R 20-21,000 each); 50,000 black ’elite’ households about R 300
million (R 6,000 each); 310,000 other black households R 300 odd million
(about R 1,000 each.) This suggests a white/black differential of the order
RQof 12 to 1 - about the same as in Zimbabwe immediately before independence - 
and a 6 to 1 ratio between the ’elite' and ’mass’ African household groups. 
The household estimate of 400,000 is a rough approximation assuming an average 
black household size of about 4.
One difficulty is that in Namibia ’household’ is a very problematic term as 
demonstrated in detail in Chapter 23, Women in Development. Given the degree 
of fragmentation in most divided households (including cases in which the 
southern male member of the nominally northern household has acquired a second 
household near his place of work), these are treated in Table 5 as separate 
households. This is, in fact, more consistent with the standard definition of 
a household as a unit which exist under one roof than the approach of treating 
all migrants as members of temporarily divided rural households.
Imprecise as this picture may be, it identifies four key macro-economic 
challenges arising from household income distribution:
1. massive racial inequality of income distribution;
2. very sharp ’elite'/mass inequality of African income distribution;
3. household incomes for the majority (probably 6 0 -1 0 % ) of black households
40well below any plausible absolute poverty line;
4. an increase in the number in the absolute poverty category - as a result 
of population increase, war dislocation and damage, static or falling 
formal sector employment and - especially for rural households - a 
significant worsening of their absolute position over the past decade.
Economic Structure
The broad structure of production by sector has already been sketched; its 
sectors are addressed in detail in subsequent chapters. Two aspects require 
further consideration here: the production relations (or organisation) of
sub-sectors and the causal forces behind the degree of specialisation and
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non-integration.
ii iMinerals production is dominated by two TNC groups: RTZ (Rossing) and
Anglo-American/De Beers (CDM and, via Consolidated Goldfields and Newmont, 
Tsumeb). These are - fortunately - all relatively long life mines. There are 
also two to four medium size mines including two controlled by South African 
metal producers who use their output. The balance of the sector is made up of 
small and/or short life mines plus coastal salt works - dominantly minor 
subsidiaries of much larger groups. Both capital and technology intensive, 
the main mines have historically been highly profitable (initially, but not 
recently, dependent on sub-subsistence African wage levels). At present two 
(CMD, Rossing) have reduced profits and one (Tsumeb) a loss as a result of 
extended world market depression, but their medium term capacity for export 
and surplus generation remains high.
Commercial agriculture is dominated by 3,000 odd white settler ranchers -
arguably large peasant farmers, certainly heavily dependent on elaborate state
and private service networks, financially weakened by drought and war, never
42very profitable even though paying sub-subsistence wages. It is both
capital and technology intensive. Black Namibian agriculture is largely for 
household provisioning - albeit with some production for sale despite
generally negative occupation regime policies. It is certainly not capital or 
technology intensive and has received little (and poor quality) service 
support, but at the price of very low (and probably declining) productivity.
43Fishing and fish processing are dominated by a handful of moderately large 
conglomerates most of which are South African based. The actual catching is 
largely by smaller businesses owning one or a few vessels which are de facto
employed by the major companies. The industry is severely run down and while
still profitable to the main companies (much less so for the boat operators) 
is both in a poor position to absorb further shocks and - both as to vessels 
and main operators - relatively able to move to other fishing grounds.
Meat packing - now cartelised because of overcapacity - is dominated by the 
parastatal First National Development Corporation. It is a modern capital 
intensive industry plagued by overcapacity. Other manufacturing consists of a 
handful of medium and over 150 relatively small enterprises which are mostly 
white settler or South African owned but with a cluster of agricultural
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processing and other units owned by FNDC.
Two other critical highly concentrated sectors are banking (dominated by 
Standard and Barclays) and petroleum distribution (largely Shell and BP). 
While currently run as part of their South African units, these enterprises 
are part of British and Anglo-Dutch TNC groupings. Both are skill and 
technology, rather than physical capital, intensive.
The reasons for Namibia’s structure of production concentration and 
non-integration are fourfold:
a. natural resource endowment and known technological options;
b. economic incorporation of Namibia in South Africa;
c. market access;
d. profitability to corporate and settler operated enterprises.
Namibia is well endowed with a limited number of natural resources - ranching 
land; formerly and potentially fish, diamonds, uranium oxide, base metals. It 
is short of water, timber and (especially given the water constraint) high 
potential arable land. This has in large measure directed the choice of basic 
productive sectors. Diversification is possible either from new resource 
discoveries, new demand patterns making use of known resources viable and/or 
new technological application and/or infrastructure raising productivity. 
Mineral prospecting and proving is dominant in the first category. Crop 
production falls in both the second (alterations in pricing and income 
distribution) and third (irrigation, infrastructure, technical services). 
Manufacturing - beyond processing based on major natural resource based 
primary products is largely dependent on the second type of change. The 
manufacturing sector can generate substantial forward (to end uses) and 
backward (to input producers) linkages. Light engineering and heavy 
maintenance are examples of the former while food processing (meal and flour, 
vegetable oil, tomato paste, dairies, etc., an outlet for increased local crop 
and milk production) and textiles (linking back to cotton) are important 
examples of industries capable of generating backward linkage. The potential 
of a linkage strategy aimed at achieving greater domestic economic integration 
- and thereby reducing import dependence - are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 1 0, Industry.
Technological change need not be limited to the large scale, modern economic
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sectors. Indeed, if it is to assist in reducing absolute poverty rapidly by
allowing low income households (especially but not only, in peasant
agriculture, technological change must include a focus on upgrading and
augmenting the traditional and artisinal technologies used in the peasant and 
45informal sector.
The economic incorporation of Namibia into South Africa (including into the 
RSA-TNC nexus) has influenced production patterns in several major respects:^
a. settler ranching was heavily supported primarily to secure a rural white 
population to 'hold the territory' and secondarily to augment/balance 
RSA’s own meat production sector;
b. the 'contract' labour system, reserves and limitation of black 
educational and job opportunities were imported from and evolved parallel 
to those of, South Africa;
c. exports were pushed because of RSA's weak external balance position and 
grain, dairy (after the mid-1960s) and manufactured goods production 
discouraged to provide markets for South Africa;
d. in most cases only branches rather than complete enterprises or 
institutions were created because the Namibian unit was explicitly or 
implicitly seen as a component of a South African based whole 
headquartered in the Republic - a characteristic which - at least on the 
operating side - is less true of the major mines and has eroded to a 
degree since the mid-1970s.
Market access considerations arise for two reasons. Production in dominant 
sub-sectors is far above any conceivable domestic demand (e.g. 400 to 600 
kilos of meat and fish, 60 kilos of base metals and 3 of uranium oxide yellow 
cake, plus a carat of diamonds per person annually). In these cases 
substantial production is viable only if external market access at viable 
prices is available. (Thus the potential importance of an EEC preferential 
beef quota). Second the domestic market is very small both in terms of 
population and of purchasing power, limiting the range of domestic production 
to a few basic consumer items, goods with few economies of scale in 
production, products with high natural protection (transport cost, fragility, 
perishability), inputs of goods and services into the main production 
sub-sectors and/or items given substantial protection from competing imports 
(the last, a non-existent category to date given economic incorporation into
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South Africa).
Production organisation and choice of product in colonial Namibia has been 
based on the goal of maximising enterprise surpluses. This has led to 
concentration on net rather than gross output and in recent years to 
substantial substitution of capital for labour. It has also reinforced the 
market access factor in encouraging production oriented to large, relatively 
safe, external markets.
Namibia's economic infrastructure (physical, enterprise, public service and 
skill) is also skewed because it has been built up to support and service the 
existing skewed production structure and because of the importation of the 
apartheid system.
In respect to physical infrastructure the basic position - apart from 
overdependence on the highly uneconomic railway system south of Windhoek is 
fairly good. The basic gaps are secondary, supporting pieces - e.g. feeder 
roads and boreholes in the north, village clinics and dispensaries generally.
External Balance
Namibia's 1983 external balance position (Tables 6,7) is to say the least - 
difficult to untangle. On the face of it there is a modest ordinary current 
account deficit (treating customs and excise transfers as invisible earnings) 
more than offset by transfer payments, and a substantial net outflow of 
capital other than occupation regime 'external borrowing'.
Namibian exports of goods and non-factor services in 1983 totalled about R 
1,060 million over 90?. Imports of goods and non-factor services totalled R 
1,170 million for a deficit before customs and excise transfer of R 150 
million, a surplus on trade account adjusted for that item of R 100 million.^ 
Recorded factor payments (interest and dividends) probably were of the order 
of R 120 million leaving a normal CAD of R 20 million and a surplus’of about R 
260 million odd after transfer payments consisting basically of RSA budget 
support and of railways transfers to cover their cash flow deficit.
As net 'external borrowing' by the occupation regime (basically from South 
African financial institutions) was of the order of R 150 million this leaves
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a total of R 420 million odd for personal remittances, underestimation of 
factor payments, private capital outflow (including Rossing debt repayment), 
increase in (South African) currency in circulation and changes in territorial 
financial institution balances and net trade credit outstanding. This sum is 
almost impossible to disaggregate on existing data, but a first attempt at 
orders of magnitude (Table 9) suggests that this is a plausible explanation.
Compared to 1977 the situation has worsened; imports have risen sharply 
relative to exports; non-customs and excise transfers have become significant; 
reduced profit remittances result from lower profits not higher retentions; 
capital flight has become significant if very hard to estimate. Exports have 
in fact not risen appreciably even in nominal terms since 1978 (rising until 
1980 and thereafter declining) while physical imports (theoretically excluding 
all war related transactions) have apparently fallen even in nominal terms 
since 1981. This would suggest a 20-3055 fall in volume terms.
Exports make up is dominated by minerals - in 1983 R 800 million odd or 80$ 
(two fifths uranium oxide, one third diamonds, perhaps a fifth 
copper-lead-zinc and under a tenth other). Fish and products probably account 
for about 10$ as do meat-cattle-karakul wool.
Since 1977 there has been a fall of the livestock component from a fifth to a 
tenth in favour of minerals. Within minerals diamonds have fallen from about 
40$ to about 25$ of visible exports and uranium oxide (not in full production 
in 1977) risen from about 15$ to over 30$.
The overall balance of payments is marked by extreme fragility - as indicated 
by the dependence on external transfers. The export position - because of its 
concentration - is exceedingly vulnerable to uranium oxide and diamond prices 
and saleability, base metal prices, beef export market access and prices, fur 
fashions and therefore prices, drought and fish stocks.
The potential for short term macro economic (overall) improvement in the level 
of export proceeds is - as of 1985 - limited. What there is turns on the 
possibility of general world price improvements. The medium term potential is 
somewhat speculative but also somewhat better.
In the short run the volumes of meat, karakul and fish exported is unlikely to
• *
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rise. Time will be required for herds to be restored and for fish stocks to
rebuild themselves. Further, transitional falls at and after independence are
highly probable. Over the medium term herd restoration is clearly possible
and - with control over total catches and Namibian participation in the deep
water branch of fishing - present export levels of fish products can probably 
48be doubled.
The probable short term trend in volume of base metal exports is downward.
Several short life mines will be closed; no new mines are under development.
At independence it is likely that data from prospecting will be adequate to
begin the 3 to 5 year development phase for one or more new mines if adequate 
finance (public or private), foreign exchange (from external capital flows to 
the public or private mining enterprises) and reasonable market prospects 
exist.
As the world uranium oxide industry is now operating at 70-75% of capacity and 
Rossing faces a rundown of its long term contracts, its return to full 
production is unlikely before about 1990 when an improved balance between 
supply and demand is anticipated. For the same reason the pre-1990 completion 
of Langer Heinrich or development of other proved uranium ore deposits is
highly unlikely.
Future recovery of diamond export volume (and improvement of price received) 
turns - ironically - on the Central Selling Organisation’s ability to regain 
tight control over the market via supply adjustment and demand manipulation. 
While a complete breakdown (with sharp price falls) appears unlikely, so does 
a speedy recovery in volume, especially of large stones from CDM. When market 
buoyancy is restored, CDM production volume can readily be increased by 50-75%  
and a substantial quantity of stockpiled stones sold if they are in Namibia 
(and not London) at independence.
The possibility of achieving substantial unit price increases on diamonds by
the elimination of transfer pricing is highly speculative. The Thirion
Commission hearings demonstrated the need for greater state surveillance over
mining strategy and practice, diamond marketing and CDM-CSO-De Beers financial
49flows. It did not, in fact, demonstrate massive transfer pricing. 7 Given a 
nearly 50% reduction in volume of diamond exports since 1977 (at which point 
the Thirion Commission data suggested little transfer pricing) and CSO price
I *
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increases since of the order of 100%, the relative similarity of 1983 to 1977 
diamond export proceeds on first examination suggests the reverse. Detailed 
review will be required at independence. Experience elsewhere suggests that a 
10—15% increase in unit prices to CDM may well be attainable, but not the 100* 
some Thirion evidence might suggest.
Hydrocarbon exports - as of 1985 - are at least five to ten years away.^ 
There are no proven petroleum reservoirs either offshore or in the Etosha 
Easin. Substantial additional seismic work and drilling would be needed to 
establish the presence of commercially viable fields (if they exist) and, in 
either location, development would be likely to be protracted. The total cost 
of locating, proving and developing a $ 10 0-3 00 million (500,000 to 1,500,000 
tonnes) a year oilfield is very unlikely to be less than $500-1 ,000 million - 
a sum it is most improbable anyone (even Soekor) will risk in Namibia before 
independence and the time span after serious new work is begun to production 
would be at least 5 to 7 years.
Potentially commercially viable natural gas reserves (the Kudu field offshore 
the Orange River mouth - Luderitz coastal range) are virtually proven. 
However, three obstacles stand in the way of speedy utilisation. First, there 
are limited viable uses of natural gas far from substantial power markets. 
These are liquification for export (costing $3,000-$8,000 million including 
special transport vessels), chemical (largely ammonia/urea) production (with 
development and plant costs of the order of $600-750 million) and conversion 
to gasoline ($2,500-$5,000 million for a plant comparable in output to SAS0L
2). The last of these is viable only for the RSA market. Natural gas (via
methane or synthesis ammonia based gasoline is not, and is not likely to 
become, generally competitive.
Second, financing such plants is difficult and lengthy under the best of
circumstances which certainly do not exist for pre-independence Namibia and
are unlikely to pertain immediately after independence. Third, the lead time
from field proving through financing and design to construction, testing and
51production cannot be less than 5 years and is more likely to be 8 to 1 0 .''
Coal production for export is dependent not simply on proving the commercial 
nature of the Aranos deposit, but on construction of a link line to the
Trans-Kalahari and, therefore, on the existence of the latter. Given the
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raiddle and high level positions, identifying and acting on the productive 
unit, infrastructural and institutional requirements for medium term 
production restructuring and in addition mobilising substantial flows of 
external resources including personnel.
Austerity And, And For, Radical Change
The key tensions are the need to pursue austerity and radical change at the 
same time and to keep the existing macro economic core functioning while 
laying the foundations for its augmentation and structural alteration. 
Whether syntheses in respect to these two dialectical contradictions are 
attainable in practice (as opposed to in macro economic scenario sketching) is 
unclear. The case - at least at macro economic level - for seeking to do so 
is clear. All alternative scenarios imply very substantial falls in 
production, public revenue, investible surplus, consumption, employment and 
investment. None of these would contribute to making even medium term 
macroeconomic restructuring possible. All would imply losses for the majority 
of Namibians in the short and medium terms.
At macro-economic level nine priorities can be identified for action during 
the initial five years of independence. These are listed rather than detailed 
here because the articulation of possible means of execution must rest on data 
and programmatic suggestions contained in sectoral chapters and on the 
decisions of a Namibian government chosen by and responsible to the people of 
Namibia.
One is stabilisation and rehabilitation (including herd and fish stock 
rebuilding) of the present core agricultural and fishing sectors complemented 
by initial steps toward their radical restructuring (to replace departing 
settlers and companies). Complementing this would be action to raise African 
small scale farm production, with particular emphasis on the northern mixed 
farming areas and on crop production.
Another is stabilisation of the present core of mining (basically Oranjemund, 
Rossing, Tsumeb) parallel to tax and ownership/resource management reform. 
Complementary to this exploration and development (base metals, coal, 
hydrocarbons) requires to be encouraged/undertaken to lay the base for future
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output increases.
Stabilisation of other key sectors or sub-sectors (including among others 
infrastructure, banking, petroleum distribution) while identifying and filling 
immediate gaps (e.g. central bank, useability of Ruacana Falls power). 
Complementing this would be identification of medium term requirements and 
possibilities for additional lines of production and required supporting 
infrastructure.
Containment of transport costs (including subsidies) probably involving 
radical cuts in railway expenditure and services parallel to increasing access 
to road transport and rerouting the two thirds of external trade not via the 
rail link to South Africa to Namibian ports.
Radical restructuring - including major cuts in present programmes - of public 
expenditure toward universal access to basic services and accelerated middle 
and high level personnel development.
Restoration of fiscal balance by massive overall expenditure curtailment and 
substantial revenue boosting and external finance mobilisation.
Maintenance and initial augmentation of the incomes of poor (especially poor 
peasant and female headed) households, dominantly by enhanced income earning 
opportunities, as well as identification of longer term means to achieve 
relatively full, reasonably productive employment/self employment.
Estimation and budgeting of supply of and demand for critical, scarce 
resources including personnel, foreign exchange and key commodities as well as 
finance and credit - and, where necessary, instituting allocation procedures 
for balancing them (whether by market or rationing means).
Restructuring external economic flows (exports, imports, sources of finance) 
away from South Africa (which cannot be depended upon to purchase or supply 
them even were there no other objections to continuing the present 
international economic relations pattern). This will entail new enterprises 
(public and private) data collection and analysis units and public sector
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Prioritisation among these ten programme elements is a matter of marginal 
balance shifts - the central point is that substantial success on each is 
crucial to macro economic stabilisation. Quite genuine priorities outside 
macro economic analysis, e.g. participation (including aspects concerning
trade unions and women) political processes and law reform exist and can be 
pursued (at least to a substantial extent) consistent with this economic 
framework. Other macro economic and micro or sectoral economic targets - 
desirable as they may be themselves - can, at most, be catered for marginally 
in the transitional planning period because of the macro economic resource 
constraints (including personnel) identified above.
The evident question in respect to the above priority list from an orthodox 
macro economic point of view is as to the necessity of its radical change 
components. The defence is:
1 . many are essential because existing structures, enterprises and
individuals will in large part depart at or soon after independence;
2 . others - including budget cuts to finance basic services and investment - 
are crucial to regaining macro-economic balance;
3 . radical restructuring is easier to begin at a point of widespread change 
and macro economic crisis (even though resources are by definition scarce 
under those conditions);
4. the continued ability of the Liberation Movement to lead and to mobilise 
Namibian workers and peasants is integrally related to acting and being 
seen to act to begin achieving significant change on the macro economic 
as well as other aspects of Namibian national life. SWAPO neither should 
nor can put its political economic goals aside for five years and either 
retain the support of the Namibian people or be in a position to resume
them after five years of ’cautious consolidation’ have created a status
quo oriented set of institutions and outlooks. Advice to the contrary is 
quite unrealistic and naive both in political and macro political 
economic terms.
management and control devices.
This programme is not the basis for a long term development strategy. Rather
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it is an attempt to identify key macro economic elements (within the limits of 
the possible and necessary) toward a transitional (up to 5 years) 
stabilisation and rehabilitation plan which would lay the foundations on which 
such a strategy could be erected while avoiding creating new barriers to its 
execution.
»
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Macro Economic Tables
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8. Income Distribution: 1977-1983
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10. Exports and Imports: 1977-1983
11. 1983/1984 Consolidated Territorial Budget
* *
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South African Population ,Data> For Namibia
Table 1
Year Black White Total
1921 Estimate 203,451 19,714 223,165
1935 Estimate 313,457 3 1 , 2 0 0 324,657
1960 a Census 452,540 73,464 526,004
1960 b Estimate * (502,500) (73,500) (576,000)
1970 Census 6 7 1,604 90,583 762,184
1981 a Census 949,724 75,600 1,025,324
1981 b 2Adjusted 963,400 (8 1,600) ( 1,045,000)
1984 a 2Estimate 1,074,000 76,000 1 ,150,000
1984 b 2Adjusted (1 ,088,000) (8 2,000) (1 ,1 7 0,000)
Notes:
1. 1960 b backward projection from 1970 Census on assumption
of 2 .9* annual population growth.
2 . 1961 b and 1984 b adjust territorial coverage to include
all of Namibia comparable to previous RSA population 
estimates.
3. Occupation regime estimate.
Sources:
Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South West African 
Affairs 1962-63 (Odendall Report), Republic of South Africa, 
1964; Leistner, E. et al, Namibia/SWA Prospectus. Africa 
Institute of South Africa, Johannesburg, 1980.
National Atlas of South West Africa, AG SWA, 1983,
Windhoek Advertiser, 26 May 1982; SWA Secretary for Finance 
J. Jones cited in Windhoek Advertiser, 24 January 1985.
»
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Table 2
Ponulation Estimates For Namibia 1970- 1990
Year Black White Total
19701 935,000 90,000 1 ,025,000
19772 1,150,000 102,500 1,252,500
19803 1,275,000 85,000 1 ,360,000
ii
1983 1,412,500 85,000 1,497,500
18854 1,512,500 85,000 1,597,500
il1990 a4 1,805,000 85,000 1 ,890,000
1990 b5 1,805,000 (57,500)6 1,862,500
Notes
1. 1977 UNIN Estimate projected backward to 1970 at 2.95? annual growth.
2. 1977 UNIN Estimate.
3. 1980 SWAPO Estimate. 1977 UNIN Estimate projected on basis direct 
estimate white population and 3 .5? annual growth black population.
4. 1977, 1980 data projected as at Note 3.
5. 1990a adjusted for departure 42,500 (50?) present settler/expatriate
community and arrival 15,00 0 new expatriates and dependents with
independence.
6. New expatriates not necessarily white.
Sources
UNIN, Manpower Estimates and Development Projections for
Namibia, 1978; SWAPO, To Be Born A Nation, 1981; Table 1.
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Population Distribution Estimates 1980-1983 
(people 000)
A. Geographic Distribution 1980 1983
Table 3
District/Zone 
Katima Mulilo
Rural
38
Urban
7
Total (J6) 
45
Rural
40
Urban
8
Total(?) 
48
Rundu1 119 6 125 125 8 133
Oshakati 595 18 613 615 28 643
Opuwo/Opuhoho 15 5 20 16 5 21
North 767 36 803 (6 1) 796 49 845 (60)
Tsumkwe 1 1 2 1 1 2
Okakarara"' 30 11 41 32 12 45
Xhorixas 17 12 29 18 13 31
Gibeon"' 11 5 16 12 6 18
Renoboth 18 14 32 19 15 34
Central/Southern 
'Homelands1 77 43 120 (9) 83 47 130 (9)
Swakopmund 2 16 18 2 20 22
Walvis Bay 0 20 10 0 19 19
Luderitz^ 1 16 17 1 16 17
Coast 3 52 55 (4) 3 55 58 (4)
Tsumeb 10 15 25 12 13 25
Out jo 7 4 11 8 4 12
Groot Fontein 12 12 24 14 14 28
Otjiwarongo 8 12 20 8 13 21
Omaruru 3 4 7 3 4 7
Okahandja 8 8 15 8 9 17
Gobabis 20 7 27 21 7 28
Karibib 6 6 12 6 6 12
Windhoek 11 124 135 13 150 163
North/Central ’White’ 
Ranching Districts 85 192 277 (2 1 ) 93 220 313 (2 2 )
/2
« »
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Table 3 (continued)
Mariental 14 10 24 15 11 26
Maitahoho 3 2 5 4 2 6
Keetmanshoop 7 13 20 7 15 22
Bethanie 2 1 3 2 1 3
Karasburg 5 6 11 6 6 12
South ’White' 
Ranching Districts 31 32 63 (5) 34 35 69 (5)
In Namibia 973(74) 345(26)1318(100) 1009(72) 406(28)1415(1 0 0)
In Exile — 42.5 — — 82.5
Total 1 ,3 6 0 - 1 ,497.5
Notes: 1. Districts given name of main town not ’homeland1' designation.
2. Includes Oranjemund.
All estimates highly approximate. District estimates 
rounded to nearest 000.
3. Sex/Age Distribution
1980s - % of population 
South African
Census Adjusted
Women 51 51.5
0 - 6 10.5 I i
7 - 1 7 14 15.5
ia+ 26.5 25
Men 49 48.5
0 - 6 10.5 11
7 - 1 7 14 14.5
Ik- 24.5 23
Total 100 100
0 - 6 21 22
7 - 1 7 28 30
18+ 51 48
Note: Estimated from Table 2; National Atlas South West Africa
Sections 40 and 42-51; Pavers, B Namibia: An Energy Survey, 
UNDTCD, NAM/79/001, New York, 1985; Fragmentary reports on 
local employment, population situations. Subject to wide 
error margin but probably less so than ’official’ data.
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Table 5 -51-
1983 Gross Domestic Product
Sector RSA E:stiimate Coverage Adjustment- Revised Estimate cf/0
Agriculture,
Forestry, Fishing,
Hunting 143 95 238 12
Mining 473 5 478 24
Primary 616 100 716 3§
7Manufacturing 94 40 134 6*
Construction 64 15 79 4
Electricity & Water 61 10 71 3 i
Secondary 291 65 234 14
Transport and
Communications 97 23 120 6
Trade & Accom­
modation 235 42 277 14
Financial and
Business Services 125 10 135 7
Other Services 88 30 118 6
General Government 340 25 365 18
885 130 1015 51
Tertiary Sector
GDP (at factor cost) 1720 295 2015 100
Notes:
1. Coverage Adjustment !Includes Household Self Provisioning (food, fuel 9
house construction), artisanal - semi-formal - small scale formal
undercount, domestic service and Walvis Bay.
a. Household Self Provisioning (R 75m)
Crops R 15m Fuel R 15m
Stock R 30m Hunting, Gathering R 5m
Dairy R 1 5m Stock Losses (-15m)
Primary Sector R 65m
Housing - Estimated on basis 200,000 rural dwellings, 5 year 
average life; R 250 average labour content.
Secondary Sector R 10m
b. Undercount (R 30m)
Artisanal Manufacturing R 10m
Transport R 3 m
Rental/Housing/Rooming and Trade R 17m
c. Domestic Service (R 20m)
35-40,000 at R 500-600
d. Walvis Bay (R 170m)
Fishing R 30m Transport-Communications R 20m
Salt R 5m Trade and Accommodation R 25m
Manufacturing R 30m Financial, Business Services R 1 0m
Construction R 5m Other Services R 1 0m
Electric/Water R 10m General Government R 25m
2. Includes smelting, refining.
3. Includes meat packing, fish processing.
Sources: Adapted from Statistical and economic Review 1984; methodology based
on Green, R. H., et al Namibia: The Last Colony, 1981; fragmentary and/or 
sectoral data ’subsistence' (self provisioning), forestry, fishing and fish 
processing, port, domestic service.
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Domestic and National Product: 1946 - 1983 (R 000,000)
Table 6
Year GDP GNP1 GNP as % GDP2
1946 2 2 . 2 20.4 VO rv> -0*
1950 61.0 46.4 76%
1954 107.2 74.4 70%
1956 141.6 85.1 60%
1958 121.3 83.2 69%
1962 146.7 104.1 71%
1969 368.9 27 8 .0 75%
1977 1135.0 7 1 0 . 0 63%
1983 2000.0 1320-1400 80-84Í
Notes:
1. Methods of estimating factor payments and remittances vary. 1946-62 data
are comparable with each other and probably roughly comparable with 1977
and 1983. 1969 is apparently on a basis likely to increase the GNP/GDP
ratio by a least 5$.
2. Excluding 1969 (see Note 1) the swings correspond to degree of economic
and especially enterprise surplus) buoyancy. This improved steadily over
1946-1957, worsened sharply 1958-60, recovered 1960-1977 and worsened 
radically from 1978 (and especially 1 9 8 0) onward.
Sources:
a. 1946-1962 Odendaal Report, Pretoria, 1964.
b. 1969 'Desert Deadlock' Financial Mail, 2-III-73*
c. 1977 Table 14, Namibia: The Last Colony (Green, JKiljunen, Kiljunen), 
London, 19 81.
d. 1983 GDP and BOP Tables this chapter.
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1977 1983
2Opening Capital Stock 3410 8931
Depreciation (130) (313)
O
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 335 395
Net Fixed Capital Formation^ 205 82®
4Apparent K / 0 Ratio 3*0 4.47
Basic K / 0 Ratio 2.7 2.7
Capacity Utilisation® 90% 60%
Table 7
Investment - Depreciation - Capital Stock: 1977—83  ^ (R 000,000)
Actual GDP 1135 2000
GDP at Full Capacity^ 1260 3333
GFCF/Actual GDP 30% 20
NFCF/Actual GDP 18? 4?
NFCF/Full Capacity GDP 16? 2.5?
Notes:
a 3
1. Corresponding to adjusted 1977, 1983 GDP estimates.
2. 1977 estimated on basis of 2.7 fixed capital/GDP ratio at full capacity
and 90? capacity utilisation in 1977, 1983 estimated by assuming 12g? 
annual average increase in Fixed Capital replacement cost, adjusted GFCF 
estimates, depreciation (at 3s? of opening fixed capital stock) over 
1977-83.
3* GFCF less depreciation.
4. Actual GFCF/Capital stock.
5. See Note 1. Adjusted from Zimbabwe 1974—1993-
6. Capital stock divided by Q.F.
7. Actual GDP divided by capacity utilisation ratio. In the case of
Namibia this figure could be achieved only in the context of 'normal’ 
rainfall and fish stocks, restoration of herds and the absence of armed 
struggle. At least half of the under capacity utilisation in 1933 
relates directly and indirectly to these factors.
8. The sharp drop in 1983 GFCF in official estimates may in part be the 
result of undercoverage in the provisional estimates. If so GFCF, NFCF 
and the resultant ratios of 1983 should be higher. However, the trend 
fall in GFCF and especially NFCF relative to GDP would remain clearly 
established.
Sources:
GFCF data estimated and adjusted from 1984 Statistical/Economic Review 
on basis comparable to GDP. Capital/output and depreciation ratios 
adjusted from study of Zimbabwe by X. Kadhani and R. H. Green summerised 
in April, 1985 issue of Journal of Development Plannning.
*
-54-
Table 8
Income Distribution: 1977-1983 (R 000,000)
1977 1983
Household Incomes
Wages/Salaries
Gross Operating Surpluses'
Jan Use Production 
Large Enterprise Gross Operating 
Surpluses 
GDP at Factor Cost
700
450
200
50
435
1135
1445
1127*
205
112*
555
2000
Distribution of Household Incomes 
White
Wages/Salaries 
Surpluses 
Own Use 2Number of Households 
Average per Household (R)
Black 'Elite ,3
Wages/Salaries 
Surpluses 
Own Use 2Number of Households 
Average per Household (R)
31ack Worker/Peasant 
Wages/Salaries 
Surpluses 
Own Use 2Number of Households 
Average per Household (R)
500(71%)
320
175
5
45,000(13^) 
1 1 , 1 0 0
47(756)
30
15
2
2 2 , 5 0 0 ( 656) 
12,100
153(22%)
100
10
43
2 8 2,500(81%) 
540
835(5856)
700
125
10
40,000(10?) 
20,875
305(21?)
240
60
5
50,000(12*?) 
6,100
305(21?)
187*
20
97*
310,000(77*?) 
1,000
Total
Household Incomes 
Households
Average per Household (R)
700
350,000
2,000
1,445
400,000
3,600
Notes:
1. Includes depreciation (estimated at R130 million 1977 and R313 million 
1983).
2. Rough estimate. May overstate number of white households. In respect to
black worker/peasant households, divided households are treated as
separate units thus adjustment from 6 to 4 average household size.
3* In 1977 basically workers in large mines plus limited number of
professionals, small businessmen, government employees, large scale 
non-raining enterprise employees. Rapid growth relates to upgrading of 
government black salaries, proliferation Second Tier posts, enterprise 
attempts to be seen as "equal opportunity" employers.
Sources:
1977 adjusted from Table 15 in Green, Kiljunen, Kiljunen; 1983 adjusted 
from 1984 Statistical/Economic Review and 1983/84 Budget to correspond to 
adjusted GDP. Wage/Salary level estimates based on incomplete micro data 
for some categories and posts.
Table 9
Namibian External Accounts 1977-83 (R 000,000) 1
1977 1983
Exports 800 1060
Goods 775 1005
Non Factor Services 25 55
Imports 650- 1 170-
Goods 550 1000
Non Factor Services 100 170
Trade Balance Surplus/(Deficit) 150 (1 1 0 )
2Factor Payments/Remittances 340-420 320-370,.
120Recorded Interest/Dividends3 140
Unrecorded Enterprise Remittances 75-100 50-75
Wage-Salary-Small Business
Remittances 125-150 150-175
Basic Current Account Balance (Deficit) (190-270) (430-480)
O
Government/Railways Transfer Receipts 75 625
Capital Account Net Inflow/Outflow 130-210 (35-85)
Government External Borrowing - 150
Enterprise Capital
Inflows9 150-20010 5011
Enterprise Debt
Repayment 2 (25) (50-75)
Territorial Enterprise
External Balance
Changes13 20-(10) (50-100)
Increase in RSA Currency
in circulation1 (1 0) (20-3 0)
Change in Net External
Commercial Credit
Outstanding 25 (20-30)
Capital Flight Negl (90-100)
Notes:
1. All estimates adjusted to include Walvis Bay. Goods, non-factor services 
imports, recorded interest/dividends, government/railways transfer 
receipts estimated with some degree of accuracy. Other items highly 
speculative.
2. Narrowly defined.
continued ..... /
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3. Probably seriously incomplete.
4. Adjusted for probable R20 million underestimation in provision 1983 
official estimates.
5. Not readily separable from enterprise external balance changes.
6. If savings held with Namibian financial institution impossible to 
separate accurately from enterprise external balance changes.
7. Railways R20 million 1977, R70 million 198 3• Both government and 
railways include capital account transfers as well as recurrent, 
government transfers include R55 and R275 million for 1977 and 1983 
respectively (adjusted to include all of Namibia).
8. Includes parastatals other than railways. Includes loan and equity 
capital inflows.
9. Dominated by Rossing/Otjihase mine development.
10. Probably largely mineral exploration.
11. Largely external loan payments by Rossing in 1983.
12. See Notes 5 and 6. Includes head office account balances of branches.
( ) means increase in net external claims.
13* Because RSA - not Namibian - currency is used in Namibia, increased
currency circulation de facto represents a capital outflow (purchase of 
external asset).
14. ( ) means reduction in external commercial credit used.
15. ( ) means outflow. Highly speculative and if via shifting financial 
institution accounts almost impossible to disentangle from enterprise 
external balance changes.
Sources:
Statistical/Economic Review 1982, 1983; Green, Kiljunen, Kiljunen, 
Namibia: The Last Colony, Tables 14, 17, 20; various micro estimates. In 
both years exports adjusted to include new data on probable tourism 
receipts (see Chaper 7 Wildlife and Tourism) and to take toll smelting 
receipts into account.
Table 9 (continued notes, etc.)
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Table 10
A. Exports: 1977-1983 (R 000,000) 1
1977 1983
Meat Products 15 30
Live Cattle 50 35
Karakul, Wool, Mutton 70 20
Fish Products 65 95
Diamonds 300 250
Uranium Oxide 110 325
3ase Metals, Other Metals and
2Minerals, Concentrates 150 220
2Other Visible Exports 20 30
4Exports Non-Factor Services 25 55
Total 800 1060
Notes:
1. Adjusted to include all of Namibia.
2. Includes concentrates, ores, salt.
3. Hides and skins may account for up to 25i.
4. Includes tourism, business travel, toll smelting, non-Namibian ores.
Sources: Statistical/Economic Review, 1984; Namibia:The Last Colony, Tables
18, 20; Quarterly Economic Review of Namibia, etc. (Economist Intelligence 
Unit), various issues 1983, 1984; Financial Mail and Rand Daily Mail, various 
issues.
B. Imports: 1977-1983 (R 000,000) 1
1977 1983
Grain"1 5 25
2Other Food 15 30
2Passenger Cars 15 30
Other Consumer Goods^ 1271 (1 6 1) 250 (335)
Fuel5 60 275
Other Intermediate Goods^ 1 1 2 \ (1721) 135 (410)
Transport Equipment7 20 30
Other Capital Goods7 195 (215) 225 (255)
Total 550 1000
continued /
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Table 10 continued 
C. Direction of Trade 1983/8*1
Imports (R 000,000)
RSA Other
Grain 25 -
Other Food 25 5
Automobiles 20 10
Other Consumer Goods 200 50
Fuel 275 -
Other Intermediate Goods 75 60
Transport Equipment 15 15
Other Capital Goods 125 100
Total 760 240
7691 rj-C\J
1. If fuel treated as 50% other RSA share falls to 63?.
2. Dominantly Western Europe, North America, Japan, in that order.
Note: Estimated from import patterns of Botswana, Swaziland.
Exports (%)
Adjusted to Include 
Recorded Exports Namibian SEZ Fish
Western Europe 33-35 32-34
USA1 22-28 2 0 - 2 6
South Africa 1 8 -2 0 18-20
Japan 14-16 12-14
Independent Africa 1 - 2 1 - 2
Socialist Europe - 5-6
Other 4-6 4-5
Note: 1 . Treats diamonds in terms of final destination - most via
RSA, London and often Amsterdam.
Estimated from incomplete micro data on destination of exports.
* '*
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Table 11
A. 1983/84 Consolidated Territorial Budget (R 000,00o)”1
Total ExDenditure 1 ,3 0 0 Total Finance 17 3C
Recurrent 1 ,0 5 0 Revenue 7506
Capital 200 Gap 500
By Category By Category
Second Tier Indirect (360)
Central Budget 2 85 Custom Excise 275
Own Revenue 1502 Sales Tax 85
Central Admin’stn. 40 Direct (215)
'Debt' Service 76 Mining Taxes 75
Other Financial Other Company tax 35
Transfers 79 Dividend Remittance Tax 10
Defence 713 Personal Income Tax 1457
Police 533 Other (175)
Agriculture 70 Service Charges and Rates 140
Transport 91 Fees, Licences, etc. 35
Water 56 Subtotal 750
Education 42 (1 2 2)U RSA Transfer 275
Health 32 (8 2 ) 4 Borrowing 195
Walvis Bay 114 Residual 30
Other5 141 Total 1 ,3 0 0
Total 1 ,3 0 0
Notes:
1. Adjusted to cover Walvis Bay plus Second Tier and Municipal expenditure 
from own revenue.
2. Dominantly white Second Tier and Windhoek.
3. Excludes expenditure on RSA Budget. Also excludes ’home guards’ etc., on 
second tier budgets.
4. Including ’Second Tier’funding purportedly spent on these heads.
5. Includes municipal budget guesstimates.
6. Includes Walvis Bay, Second Tier, Municipal.
7. Collected by Second Tier. Indirect tax revenue is aggregated into RSA 
Revenue Estimates.
Sources: 1983/84 Budget Estimates adjusted on the basis of fragmentary data
on Second Tier, Municipal, Walvis Bay expenditure and revenue; Thomas, W. H., 
’’Namibia 1985: A New Start", address 3-VI-85 at Klein Windhoek.
continued /(2)
« ♦
3. 1984-85'
Estimated
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Table 11 continued (2)
Expenditure Budget Actual
Second Tier Central Budget 305
2Own Revenue 200
Central Administration 58
Justice and Police 66
2Defence 131
'Debt* Service 149
Other Financial 98
nNational Education (135) 56
National Health (75)^ 14
Water Affairs 56
Agriculture 46
Posts, Telecommunications 59
Transport 97
Economic and Manpower 96
Others 149
Total 1 ,5 8 0 1 , 5 2 0
Recurrent Expenditure 1,340
Capital
Revenue^
240
Opening Surplus 56 68
Indirect 400 410
Customs/Excise (275)
Sales Tax (125)
Direct 320 340
Mining Tax (105)
Other Company Tax (30)
Personal Income Tax (175)
Dividend Remittance Tax (1 0)
Other 150 157
Loans Raised 180 220
RSA Transfer Basic 318 318
RSA Transfer Defence 54 54
Total 1,473 1,542
Expenditure 1 ,5 8 0 1,520
7Revenue 875 912
Gap 705 608
continued..... /(3)
41 »
Table 11 continued (3)
Notes:
1 - 6. See 11A -
7. Excludes Opening Surplus, RSA Transfers, Loans Raised.
Sources: See 11A and Dirk Mudget, Budget Speech, 5-VII-85.
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Notes
1. The data used are largely derived from the sources cited below. Unless 
otherwise noted tables and quantitative estimates, are adapted from 
Statistical/Economic Review and/or National Atlas. Sources for Tables 
are given at end of each Table.
2. Journal of Development Planning (United Nations), Special Issue on
Economic Malaise in SSA (R. H. Green, editor), April 1985; World Bank, 
World Economic Survey 1985, Washington, 1985; World Bank, Toward 
Sustainable Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Programme of
Action, 1984.
3. For fuller account and tabular summary see Green, Kiljunen, Kiljunen 
( 1981) .
4. See Moorsom (CIIR, 1982) and Africa Contemporary Record (1980/81 -
1983/84).
5. See Moorsom (CIIR, 1984).
6. Most markedly the improper exclusion of Walvis Bay, the gross 
population underestimation and the failure to estimate household 
production for own use ("subsistence”)
7. Statistical/Economic Review (1982, 83, 84).
8. ibid.
9. See Green, Kiljunen, Kiljunen (1981): Aulakh and Asombang (UNIN, 1985) 
SWAPO (1981).
10. Statistical/Economic Review (1984) and De Beers, Annual Reports, 
Johannesburg, 1980-1985.
11. See Green (UNIN 1978) For 1977; Chapter 18, Population and labour for 
more detailed discussion; SWA/Namibia Manpower Survey 1984 for official 
estimates.
12. See Von Ginneken (1985) and Chapter 23, Income Distribution.
13. For fuller discussion of political and social consequences and dynamics 
Chapter 1 , Historical and analytical Overview; 15, Health and Social 
Welfare, 24, Women in Development.
14. Of 310,000 black worker/peasant households with an estimated average 
(mean) income of R 1 , 0 0 0 per year at least 240,000 have incomes under 
R900 per year. That is below any reasonable family (3 or more) 
absolute, poverty line and very close to it for a single person urban 
household.
15. Estimated as including 20, 000 odd government/ ’homelands’, 10-12,500 
mining, 1 7,500-20, 000 other large enterprise (including about 3,000
parastatal) employees and 10,000, self employed (e.g. Renoboth and 
'traditional elite' ranches, small business proprietors, 'internal 
party' political 'leaders', professionals).
See ACR (1982-3, 1983-4)
See ACR (1982-83, 83-84); Thomas (1981) Green, Kiljunen and Kiljunen 
(1981) especially pp49-52 and Tables 31-32.
Estimated From National Atlas and Rivers (1985); See Chapter II, 
Transport for more detailed discussion.
In 1985/86 or 1986/87 there is likely to be a formal transfer of the 
SATs operations in Namibia to the Administrator General which will put 
the deficit to 'SWA Account' but is unlikely to have any other 
significant results.
For fuller acount see ACR (1982-83, 1983-84).
See ibid especially account of CDM Managing Director's speech on 
economic policy very obviously addressed to anticipated incoming 
national government not to existing RSA regime or its puppets.
See Statistical/Economic Review (1982, 83, 84).
Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Bulletin (Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland), London various issues 1984.
The areas of greatest doubt are:
a. Walvis Bay;
b. household production for own use; and
c. information sector.
But in some these do not exceed 20* of GDP so that even an error of 25% 
would affect overall GDP by only 5?. The estimates for the large and 
medium scale modern sector enterprises plus government which dominate 
the economy appear to be reasonably accurate. GDP per capita is more 
problematic because the population estimates are uncertain. GNP (Gross 
National Product) is even more problematic because estimates of 
transfer payments out of wages and profits and for interest are at best 
rough orders of magnitude. Lf customs and excise were actually 
collected by Namibia instead of paid out in cif import prices and 
roughly recovered by a fiscal transfer there might be formal 
adjustments to GDP and GNP but the real position would be altered only 
to the extent the new cif import cost was was more or less than the 
present cost less the related RSA transfer payment.
Published in Green, Kiljunen, Kiljunen (1981) especially Tables 13-20. 
Von Ginneken (1985)
See Chapter 1, Historical and Analytical Overview: Green, Kiljunen,
Kiljunen (1981) Chapters 3*4.
Statistical/Economic Review (1982, 83, 84).
r * ♦
— i i i -
29. ibid.
30. ibid.
3 1 . ibid.
32. Summarised in article by Green, R. H. and Kadhani, X. in Journal of 
Development Planning, April 1985, op. cit.
3 3. op. oit.
34. Or it may be an example of the semi-latent "white territorial 
nationalism" discussed in Chapter 1.
35. See Green, Kiljunen, Kiljunen (1981) Tables 15,17; Ginneken (1985); 
Chapter 23, Income Distribution.
36. The elite has been created in the sense that it has - and wishes to 
preserve - higher incomes but not in that of being anti-nationalist or 
loyal to South Africa.
37. Green, Kiljunen, Kiljunen (1981), Tables 15, 17.
38. These are largely within black worker/peasant sub-group. From 'black 
elite' employees (especially in mining) to it they are not negligible. 
Remittances are received by many households but do not appear to be 
large for more than a small proportion of rural households (assuming a 
divided household is treated as two units. If not, such transfers are 
intra-household and true inter-household transfers probably are 
negligible at macro level).
39. This is not entirely coincidental. The Smithorewa regime in 
"Zimbabwe/Rhodesia" introduced selected salary and wage upgrading to 
try to buy black support in a way analagous to 1982-1985 RSA policies 
in "SWA/Namibia".
40. See Note 34.
41. See Mines and independence (C11R, 1983); Chapter 8, Mining.
42. See Moorsom (CIIR, 1982) Oloya et al (UNIN 1984); Chambers and Green in 
Green, Kiljunen, Kiljunen; Chapter 4 Agriculture.
43. See Moorsom (CIIR, 1984); Chapter 5 Fisheries.
44. See Chapter 1 9. Financial Institutions.
45. See Chapter 25, Science and Technology, for fuller discussion of 
upgrading, augmenting traditional and artisanal technologies.
46. See also Kiljunen and Green, in Green, Kiljunen and Kiljunen (1981); 
Aulakh and Asorabang (UNIN, 1985); Clarence Smith and Moorsom (1975); 
Moorsom (1977); Chapter 1.
-iv-
47. The case for showing adjusted figures is that de faoto Namibia pays 
this tax embodied in cif import values and then collects it back from 
South Africa as a transfer payment.
48. See Chapter 5, Fisheries for more detailed discussion and projections.
49. This opinion has been argued in some detail in a confidential 
memorandum by an expert, specialist independent diamond analyst who has 
served on the opposite side of the table from De Beers in several 
negotiations.
50. See Chapter 10, Energy; and Rivers (1985)
51. Estimates based on discussion with hydrocarbon plant construction and 
chemical production experts and on basis experience of Tanzania in 
respect to offshore natural gas development.
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